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SHIFTING CONTROL WITHOUT SELLING THE BUSINESS INTEREST*
G. Charles Scharfy
Frequently family tax planning on the part of the owner of a small
business necessitates a change in the character of his holdings and a change
in the degree of his control of the business without a sale. Such a change
may be effected by a tax-free recapitalization,' or the issuance of a pre-
ferred stock dividend. The desired result may also be obtained by the
issuance of new stock to key employees or by means of the stock option.'
The family or business objectives to be obtained will generally determine
the method that is to be adopted.
RECAPITALIZATIONS BY ISSUANCE OF PREFERRED STOCK
Perhaps the most important of these avenues of approach are the
"recapitalizations," which have as their primary objective the shifting of
control of the business to relatives of the owner who are in the business
or to key employees, but at the same time allowing the former "boss" to
retain a substantial financial stake in the continuing enterprise. Under
section 112(b) (3) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code the courts be-
stowed judicial blessing upon recapitalizations, even though such re-
capitalizations effected a complete realignment of powers and rights
among the shareholders inter se.3 The courts did, of course, require a
"business purpose" in these recapitalizations. However, the "business
purpose" of these cases involved merely the desirability of transferring
control of the companies to experienced or capable executive personnel,
and away from older, retiring, or inexperienced persons who might
otherwise have retained control to the ultimate detriment of the business
entity.
; This article is intended to update and summarize certain problems covered in the 1958
Tax Institute. Calkins, et al., Tax Problems of Close Corporations: A Survey, 10 WEsT. REs.
L. REV. 9 (1959). See particularly the discussion on Leverage Stock by Barring Coughlin.
Id. at 98. It should also be noted that the present article describes the methods by which the
owner of a family business may give up control and maintain a financial interest. Thus the
planning purpose discussed in this article is contrary to that discussed in two previous articles
where the purpose was to give up a financial interest in the business without necessarily giving
up control.
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E) [hereinafter cited as CoDE Q], defines "re-
organization" to include "recapitalizion." CODE § 354(a) (1) provides that an exchange
pursuant to a plan of reorganization of stock or securities by a party to the reorganization is
tax free.
2. CODE § 421.
3. Majorie H. Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 1; Elmer W. Hartzell,
40 B.T.A. 492 (1939), acq., 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 16.
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Meanwhile, a somewhat parallel line of decisions under the 1939
Code provisions permitted the removal of a substantial portion of a share-
holder's financial stake in the business, through the device which is
familiarly known as the "preferred stock bail-out." This device consists
of a distribution of pro rata dividends of preferred stock to holders of
common shares. These dividends were held to be non-taxable." The
subsequent sale of the preferred stock was held to result in a capital gain
to the shareholder.'
The advantages accompanying "realignments" of stock interests
through recapitalizations and accompanying preferred stock bail-outs led
to such an enthusiastic reception by taxpayers that Congress, in its 1954
reanalysis of the revenue structure, decided to insert some checkreins in
this area. Accordingly, section 306 of the 1954 Code was enacted. Al-
though it continued the tax-free nature of the immediate transaction, that
is, the recapitalization and the stock dividend, it provided in effect that
certain shareholders must take the "bitter with the sweet" by imposing
possible tax penalties upon subsequent dispositions of their "non-com-
mon" stock holdings In other words, gain on subsequent resale by share-
holders was to be taxed as income, not as capital gains.
Section 306, which covers the recapitalization and the preferred stock
bail-out areas,' has already received extensive analysis and treatment by
tax authors,' and the purpose of our discussion here is to consider only
certain aspects of this section's applicability to the "family business"
situation.
First, the owner of the business should keep in mind the fact that the
receipt and subsequent possession of section 306 stock does not always
involve ordinary income tax consequences. For example, a sale or re-
4. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943). Section 305 (a) of the 1954 Code states
that "... . gross income does not include the amount of any distribution made by a corporation
to its shareholders, with respect to the stock of such corporation, in its stock or in rights to
acquire its stock."
5. Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918
(1954).
6. CODE § 306(c) (1) (B) (i). "[Stock which is not common and] which was received,
by the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of such stock, in pursuance of a plan of re-
organization (within the meaning of Section 368 (a) )...."
7. CODE § 306(c) (1) (A). "Stock (other than common stock issued with respect to com-
mon stock) which was distributed to the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of such
stock if, by reason of section 305 (a), any part of such distribution was not includible in the
gross income of the shareholder."
8. Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 65 YALE L.
909 (1956); Black, Common Stock and the Bail-Out Section, 38 TAX1S 395 (1960); Dean,
Rules Governing Preferred Stock Bail-Outs, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 691 (1956);
Harris, The Status of Preferred Stock Bail-Outs, 34 TAXES 403 (1956); Kanter, Voting Pre-
ferred Stock Given in "B" Reorganization May Be Section 306 Stock, 39 TAXES 88 (1961);
Reiser, Dividends, Bail-Outs and Other Corporate Distributions, 32 TAXES 989 (1954);
Young, Preferred Stock Bail-Outs: Statutory Restrictions: Pitfalls and Continuing Opportunities
under the 1954 Code (Section 306), N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 431 (1957).
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demption of section 306 stock which completely terminates the owner's
stock interest in the company will not give rise to ordinary income, nor
will distributions in partial or full liquidation of the company.' Again,
if the owner plans to make gifts to charity, he can utilize section 306
stock without realizing income at all.' ° In addition, if the owner wishes
to retain his stake in the business until he dies, any section 306 stock
owned by him will lose its "taint" upon his death. 1
Second, the owner of the business should recognize that by the re-
ceipt of section 306 stock, he will achieve certain affirmative advantages
for his family and estate and for the business itself. He will have ob-
tained the increased protection of a preferred position of ownership, the
security of a steadier and more assured income, and the elimination, or at
least minimization, of estate valuation problems. In addition, the owner
will have enhanced the probability of the continued successful operation
of the business by having afforded an incentive to the younger executives
who will replace him, since the growth of the company and the attendant
increased valuation of ownership will be reflected in the common or ulti-
mate equity interest which the "new" owners will have.
SHIFTING CONTROL BY ISSUANCE OF STOCK TO E MPLOYEES
Direct Issuance of Stock
Up to this point we have considered shifting control by recapitaliza-
tion and by the issuance of stock dividends. Another method of achiev-
ing the same result is by diluting the owner's interest through the issuance
of additional stock to key employees. The key employee or group of
employees who will have ultimate control may be issued stock by the
company as additional compensation. The principal deterrent to this
avenue is the high tax-cost to the recipient of the stock, since the receipt
of the stock will be treated as ordinary income. It should be noted that
the employee will also receive adverse tax consequences if his additional
compensation is in the form of cash to purchase the stock, for this too will
be treated as ordinary income. By either method this tax may well be
prohibitive if the employee has worked his way up into a fairly high in-
come tax bracket.' 2 No problem, however, arises in this situation if con-
trol is wielded by a bare majority, because a shift of control may be
effected by a purchase of a small amount of stock.
9. CODE § 306(b) (1), (2). Note that the attribution rules of Code section 318 are ap-
plicable in determining whether complete termination has been achieved.
10. Rev. Rul. 57-328, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 229.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(e) (1955) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 5].
12. If the employee's additional compensation is in the form of cash, he will, at least, be able
to pay the increased tax. On the other hand, if he is issued stock, he may not have the avail-
able cash to pay the increased tax. The solution to this dilemma may be a combination of
cash and stock given to the designated employee.
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Issuance of Stock Options
Assuming that the prospective new owner is not now financially able
either to purchase the shares which will give control, or to pay the in-
come tax thereon if such shares are distributed to him as compensation,
the groundwork can be laid for future steps in this direction through the
issuance of stock options. The options may either be "restricted stock
options" as that term is defined and used in section 421 of the Internal
Revenue Code, or they may be "unrestricted."
It is not our purpose in this brief article to go into the intricacies of
restricted stock options under section 421. Suffice it to say that if the
requirements of that section are complied with,'3 the key employee may
purchase shares, pursuant to such options, without adverse tax conse-
quences when the options are issued or subsequently exercised.
On the other hand, if the key employee receives an option which
does not qualify as a "restricted stock option," he may indeed have tax
troubles. In this connection it should be remembered that it may be
very difficult to qualify an option as a "restricted stock option" in a small
family corporation where the valuation of the stock is never definite. Be-
cause of the valuation problem, the validity of the option may be ren-
dered uncertain.' 4 The tax troubles that will be encountered under an un-
restricted stock option are defined by the Commissioner in a Regulation 5
based upon two United States Supreme Court cases.' 6 These cases held
that ordinary income will be realized when the option is exercised and
when there are no restrictions upon the right to receive the stock.
The courts have also adopted a liberal interpretation of the option
procedure that may well result in adverse tax consequences for the tax-
payer. In Joseph Kane,"7 the court held that an option granted by the
chief stockholder of a company to an employee's wife was intended as
13. CODi § 421 (d). In general, the requirements of a restricted stock option are as follows:
(1) the option must be granted in connection with the grantee's employment by a corpora-
tion; (2) the option price must be at least eighty-five per cent of the fair market value of
the stock at the time such option is granted; (3) the option must not be transferable except at
death and must be exercisable, during the optionee's lifetime, only by him; (4) the option
must not run for more than ten years; and (5) if the optionee already owns more than ten
per cent of -the company's stock, the option price must be 110 per cent of the stock's value-
and the option period five years or less.
14. For a discussion of the problems that hinder the use of a restricted stock option in a.
closely-held family corporation and a discussion of the applicability of a non-restricted option
on restricted stock in this situation, see Hawkins, Tax Factors in Balancing the Interests of
Investor-Shareholders and Officer-Shareholders, 12 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 218-23 (1961).
15. Reg. § 1A21-6 (1961).
16. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 17T
(1945).
17. 25 T.C. 1112 (1956), affd per curiam, 238 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353.
U.. 931 (1957); cf. Wanda V. Van Dusen, 8 T.C. 388 (1947), afld, 166 F.2d 647 (9th
Cir. 1948).
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